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In the search for causes of the sharp increases in the price of new
homes, one of t he important but neglected factors surely is the rising
array of

govern m~nt

regul ations facing land developers, homebuilders ,

financial instit t..t ions, and all others involved i n the housing industry.
To clear the air at 1:he outset, this is not going to be an uncritical
attack on all efforts of gove rnment to regulate the private sector.
Rather, this wil l be an evaluation of the impacts of regulation on industry in general and on housing specifically . The evaluation will end with
some suggestions for i mproving the status quo in business-government
relations.
Lest I be mi sunderstood, let me state the obvious:

government regu-

lation often has yielded important benefits -- in terms of less pollution,
fewer product ha zard s, reduced job discrimination, and other socially
desirable object ives .

Tt should als o be realized that these government

programs were established in response to rising public expectations about
business performance .

But the worthiness of these social objectives should

not make the spe ci f i c met hods being used in attempting to achieve them
totally immune from criticism.

It is sad to see the almost instinctive

negative and hostile reaction, especially on the part of some of the socalled Public In: erest Groups, to anyone who even questions any of the
specific means which are used for social regulation.

I find it unfortunate

to have to remind these enthusiasts that only in a totalitarian society
does the end justify the means.
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At first blush, government imposition of socially desirable requirements on business through the regulatory process appears to be an
inexpensive way of achieving national objectives.

This practice

apparently costs the government little and represents no significant
direct burden on the taxpayer.
the cos t.

But the public does not escape paying

Every tirne, for example, that the Environ mental Protection

Agency impos es a more costly (and perhaps less polluting) method of
construct ion on any firm, the cost of the firm's product to the consumer
will rise.

Similar effects flow from the other regulatory efforts,

including those involving pr·oduct safety, job health, and equal employment
(and credit) opportunity.
These higher prices, we need to come to recognize, represent the
"hidden tax'' of regulation which is shifted from the government to the
consumer.

It is not inevitable that every regulatory activity increase

inflationary pressures.

In those instances where regulation generates

social benefits (such as a healthier and thus more productive work force)
in excess of the social costs it imposes, inflationary pressures should
be reduced.

But if the costs are ignored and the focus of public policy

is only on the benefits, it is almost inevitable that the regulation
will be pushed beyond the point where the benefits equal the costs and
to the zone of overregulation.

Overregulation, to an economist, is not

an emotional term, but merely the shorthand for situations where the costs
imposed by regulation exceed the benefits from the regulation.
The basic point of this presentation is that the regulatory process
should be revised so as to derive, at lower costs, much of the same
benefits as are now achieved.

But before we turn to the subject of change,

let us first examine more closely the various economic effects of regulation.
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The Range of Housing Regulation
Government regulation can increase the costs of new homes in many
ways, driving up land and land development costs, increasing the number
of expensive building code features to be incorporated, raising overhead
expenses of real estate and financial institutions, and increasing
financing costs due to project delays.
In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion of regulation
affecting housing at all levels of government.
of special significance cover a wide range.

Newer federal regulations

They include standards for

water quality, pollution discharge, and dredge and fill operations;
sanctions against localities that do not restrict developments in floodprone areas; requirements for state and local governments to regulate
activities which pollute the air; and regulations affecting closing and
settlement procedu res and the extension of mortgage credit.
Several states have extended their regulations affecting housing
development.
1
'

New types of rules include those governing building in

critical'' areas such as wetlands, floodplains, and shorelands.

States

have also enacted measures to control erosion and stormwater runoff, to
control water and air pollution, and to require environmental impact
statements.
At the local level, the major change has been toward a fuller and
more systematic use of traditional land use control techniques.

These

are often supplemented with such new departures as development timing and
rate controls, higher contributions of land or facilities from developers
to the local government, and special standards for marshes and floodplains.
Moreover 11 growth management 11 has become fashionable in many expanding areas.
Such limitations on the supply of developable land, no matter what the i r
motivation, force up the price of land and of homes generally.

- 4The Costs of Housing Regulation
There have been several important efforts to quantify the growing
costs that result from the rising array of regulation of homebuilding
and housing activities.

A study in Colorado found that changing regulatory

requirements and practices had added $1,500 - $2,000 to the cost of the
typical new house built between 1970 and 1975.

The added cost consisted

of higher water and sewer tap fees, increased permit fees, greater school
and park land dedication requirements, and new mandates for wider and
thicker streets, fences, underground storm sewers, and environmental
impact studies.
A study in St. Louis County, Missouri, of the increase in lot development and homebuilding costs during 1970-75 found that the expense of
rr.~1

rneeti ng

government requirements came to $1 ,600 - $2,500 for a typi ca 1

1600 square foot house on a 10,000 square foot lot.

THe new governmentally-

imposed requirements included street lighting, greater collector street
widths, hisher permit and inspection fees, added features to electrical
systems, and smoke detectors .
.A.

stl1dy covering 21 residential development projects in the New Jersey

Coastal Zone estimated the direct regulatory expenses for a single family
house at

~;1

,600 during the period 1972-75.

The costs covered some 38

separately required permits, including preliminary plat, performance
improvement bond, sewer plan, tree removal permit, final plans review,
road drainage permit, and coastal area facilities permit.
Several studies have examined the adverse impacts of overly stringent
or outdated building codes.

A study at Rutgers University developed

estimates of such costs as somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of total
unit costs.

Yale University economists have done some interesting work
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on identifying the extent to which building codes serve as barriers to
innovation.

They point out that the "bewildering variation" in local

regulations may bar potentially profitable innovations in some areas.
This reduces the size of the market for technical change in the homebuilding industry, with a negative effect on the incentive of building
materials suppliers to perform research and development in this field.
The federal government is beginning to get into the building standards
The initial results are not promising.

area.

The new ruling on archi-

tectural glazing materials issued by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
is estimated to cost an additional $30 - $50 per house.

The average

benefits are expected to be a small fraction of that amount.
More fragmentary, although intriguing, estimates are available of
the indirect costs of regulation to the home buyer.

Giving borrowers the

booklet required by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act costs about
35 cents.

Completing the forms required by Truth-in-Lending legislation

may cost no more than "a few dollars."

But the regulatory delays in

carrying out a construction project may be far more costly.

The National

Association of Home Builders states that financing and carrying charges
for homebuilding come to $10 - $18 a day per lot.

Thus, using the $10

figure, six months' delay comes to $1,825 of additional costs for each
new home.
I find particularly fascinating a recent newspaper article quoting
the Undersecretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
The federal official recalled a conversation that he had with a county
commissioner when he was a builder in Florida.
was explaining his
··~Jhen

11

The county commissioner

pinbal1" technique for protecting the environment:

a builder comes in with a certain project, I just bounce him

a round from one department to another.

il

- 6 The rising paperwork and ancillary requirements of government agencies
inevitably produce a lengthening

11

regulatory lag, 11 a delay that often runs

into years and is a costly drain on the time and budgets of private
managers as well as public officials.

Ten years ago, the director of

planning of the Irvine Company obtained in 90 days what was then called
zoning for a typical residential development.

A decade later, the

company received what is now called an entitlement to build for one of
its developments, but only following two years of intensive work by a
specialized group within the company's planning department, aided by the
public affairs staff.
The Need for Change
What can be done to improve the situation?

Before we tackle that

question, we all need to remind ourselves that important and positive
benefits have resulted from many of the government's regulatory
activities.

We also must realize that these government activities were

established in response to a surge of rising public expectations about
corporate performance.

Thus, reforming government regulation involves

striking balances among many laudable objectives and is hardly a search
for villains.

Indeed, the magnitude of the unresolved problems in the

regulatory area requires efforts by government, business, academic
researchers, the various interest groups, and the media.

Here are some

of those tasks, at least as I see them:
1.

Role of Government.

The basic task of government in the

regulatory reform area is not to be preoccupied with either technical
measurements of benefits and costs or administrative procedures, although
good can be achieved by some sensible changes.

But more fundamentally,

the government leadership -- at federal, state, and local levels -- needs
to take a dramatically different view of the regulatory mechanism than
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they now do.

Rather than relying on regulation to control in detail

every facet of private behavior, the regulatory device needs to be seen
as a very powerful tool to be used reluctantly, and with great care and
discretion.

A good deal of judgment is required in sorting out the hazards

that it is important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that,
in Charles J. Schultze's terms, can best be dealt with by ''the normal
prudence of consumers, workers, and business firms."

When the device of

regulation is relied upon, the emphasis should be placed on identifying
the least costly and most effective means of achieving social objectives.
To state what is obvious to an economist but so often ignored in more
popular discussions, you do not protect the consumer by punishing business.
2.

Role of Business.

The basic task of conducting business success-

fully in a regulated environment is extremely difficult.

On the one hand,

business firms need to respond to the rising public expectations for
producing safe products in a healthy work environment, free of discrinlination.

To the extent that businesses increasingly respond voluntarily --

and a great many already do -- the pressures for government intervention
may subside.

Yet, I do not advocate a passive role of automatically

agreeing to every demand on the part of each interest group, public or
private.

Those demands that do not make sense should be opposed --

lawfully and strongly -- and where appropriate more sensible alternatives
developed and presented.

Rather than vague speechifying on the evils

of big government or the glories of the free enterprise system, business
needs to concentrate its efforts on more effectively communicating the
specific impacts of regulation on its production, sales, employment, and
prices.
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3.

Role of Interest Groups.

A ·little humility might go a long way

in reducing the shrillness of many of the representatives of the so-called
Public Interest Groups.

It is no simple task to identify the public

interest in any specific issue of public policy.

As a sometime participant

in government policymaking, it is apparent to me that good policy consists
of properly balancing and reconciling a variety of bona fide interests.
This is far more difficult than merely choosing in a simple-minded fashion
between "public" or "consumer" interests (which are presumably good and
to be endorsed) and "special" interests, which are presumably evil and
to be opposed.

To quote Allen Ferguson, the head of the Public Interest

Economics Foundation, "There is an appalling lack of information as to
the nature of economics and the economy among some of the public interest
leadership.

There is some failure to recognize that economic considerations

are important in issues of most concern to much of the public in each
community.'' That i s a model of tactful and diplomatic understatement.
4.

Role of Academic Research.

Unfortunate ly, there seems to be a

parallel between generals fighting the last war and academics researching
issues of public policy.

Whether I speak to business executives, labor

union representatives, public interest groups, or government officials,
I find that their key concerns with government regulation of business
relate to the newer cross-industry type of regulation, typified by EPA,
OS HA, EEOC, ERISA, and CPSC and their counterparts at state, county, and
municipal levels.

Yet my academic brethren still seem preoccupied with

railroads, television, and airlines.
My point is not that the ICC, FCC, or CAB do not deserve professiona l
attention.

Rather, academic literature and teaching need to take fuller

account of the basic expansion in the scope and character of government
regulation of business which has been occurring in the past decade.

The

- 9expansion in regulation -- whether measured by the size of regulatory
budgets or in numbers of rules -- by and large is in these newer areas.
The prevailing theories and models of regulation need to be reworked to
take account of the revised institutional structure.
and their unions

11

Whether the railroads

Capture 11 the Interstate Commerce Commission is a far

more trivial concern than understanding the full range of impacts of
environmental, safety, and employment regulation.

That improved under . .

standing is essential for developing support for reducing the many adverse
side effects of regulation that we have been discussing -- higher costs,
loss of jobs, reduced productivity and capital formation, and a slower
rate of innovation of new and better products.
5.

The Role of the Media.

Fundamental improvements in the

regulatory system will not come about until the public demands become
strong enough to force the subject on to the legislative agendas.

This

will require communicating to the public a far greater understanding of
the actual operations of the entire gamut of government regulation.
Stereotypes need to be avoided.

Indeed, reality is extremely complex.

That is, neither business nor labor nor consumer groups are consistently
on one side of the regulatory reform issue.
For example, business firms and labor unions in a given regulated
industry often become strong supporters of the traditional industryoriented commission which they have learned to live with, if not to
dominate.

They may join ranks to oppose efforts by consumer groups and

academics to cut back on the extent of the "protective 11 regulation.
In contrast, consumer groups advocate expanding the newer types of crossindustry regulation.

They often are joined by labor groups, particularly

in the occupational health area.

Here, reform efforts are led by business
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groups and academics.

These alliances shift from time to time.

Specific

regulations affecting homebuilders may be opposed by unions and companies
in the construction industry -- although the two groups may differ strongly
on job safety standards.

The older consumer organizations are becoming

concerned with the ultimate cost to the consumer of government rules.
The newer consumer groups still emphasize public control over business.
In contrast to a widely held viewpoint, in my own experience I have
yet to come across the business executive who enjoys polluting the
environment or producing unsafe products.

What I have found is honest

disagreement as to the most sensible ways in which to proceed in
attempting to attain the nation's social objectives.

A better under-

standing of the complicated reality surely needs to be communicated to
the public and to government decision makers.

* * ************
This is an ambitious agenda for public and private action.
have encountered no

11

quick fixes

11

But I

that v10uld cure all the shortcomings

of the many efforts to regulate business.

Perhaps recognition of that

fact would set the stage for durable reforms of this aspect of businessgovernment relations which has such vital impacts on the consumer.

